Federalist 24
The next six Federalist essays (24-29), all written by Hamilton, deal with one of the most controversial powers in the Constitution: the ability to create a standing army, which, the critics claimed, posed an essential and enduring threat to liberty.
Since the essays go over a lot of the same themes it seems worth our while to go over the arguments against a standing army, the historical background, why they were thought to be a threat to liberty, and ideas raised during the Convention and ratifying conventions to deal with the problem. I’ll also briefly review part of Hamilton’s response to these arguments in Federalist 24, which he regards as motivated by either “a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous” that results “the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to [the] plan.”
The background to the debate goes to longstanding debates concerning the nature of republican government and the desire for a peaceful life. It also, in the American context, goes back to 17th century British politics and its “court vs. country” divisions. 17th century British politics witnessed the emergence of the “court” and “country” parties: the latter, the “outsider” point of view of the landed gentry that emphasized the superiority of Parliament to the crown, classical republican theory including the emphasis on virtue, a concern for personal liberty, a desire for frequent elections, and, importantly, an opposition to standing armies. The Court party referred to the King’s tendency to attract hangers-on and power brokers, to create a system of patronage, and to promote a mercantilist economic policy. One of the main concerns of members of the country party involved their belief that court politics involved a kind of corruption that would sap the strength of the nation, abet the growth of parties and divisions, and pervert the idea of service to the commonwealth. In many ways, the divisions between federalists and anti-federalists tracked that division in British politics.
In the “court” system, a strong military was thought essential to protecting the interests generated by international trade and, in the British case, the maintenance of a far-flung colonial empire. The nation’s “prosperity,” it was believed, could only be maintained and advanced through a complex, government-sanctioned system of privileges and monopolies and through a vigorous system of international trade. This system necessarily extended itself deeper into personal affairs and thus threatened the self-sufficient liberty that country members so cherished. The moneyed and commercial classes, requiring a strong military and navy to sustain their interests, many of which included the bane of luxurious living, were corrupting the morals of the nation.
The tendency of a strong central government to attract those who wanted to enrich themselves by the funds being siphoned off from the productive public remained a central anti-federalist concern. They knew that “public service” was often a fig-leaf that disguised ambition, ideological passion, and a desire to enrich oneself. The Report of the Pennsylvania Minority, one of the most powerful of the anti-federalist documents, expressed its concern about “those harpies of power, that prey upon the very vitals; that riot on the miseries of the community.” The government would increasingly be dominated by a clique that ruled in their own or the court’s interests rather than the interests of the people. The public at large would increasingly be at the mercy of a body of rulers increasingly insular and opaque. “Miserable is the lot of that people whose every concern depends on the WILL and PLEASURE of their rulers. Our soldiers will become Janissaries, and our officers of government Bashaws; in short, the system of despotism will soon be compleated.”
The members of the Court, removed from a common life, operating at a distance, their actions lacking in transparency, increasingly unaccountable, would count on “force” as a way of upholding their edicts.
From the foregoing investigation, it appears that the Congress under this constitution will not possess the confidence of the people, which is an essential requisite in a good government; for unless the laws command the confidence and respect of the great body of the people, so as to induce them to support them, when called on by the civil magistrate, they must be executed by the aid of a numerous standing army, which would be inconsistent with every idea of liberty; for the same force that may be employed to compel obedience to good laws, might and probably would be used to wrest from the people their constitutional liberties. The framers of this constitution appear to have been aware of this great deficiency; to have been sensible that no dependence could be placed on the people for their support: but on the contrary, that the government must be executed by force. They have therefore made a provision for this purpose in a permanent STANDING ARMY, and a MILITIA that may be subjected to as strict discipline and government.
A standing army in the hands of a government placed so independent of the people, may be made a fatal instrument to overturn the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of the most oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures. An ambitious man who may have the army at his devotion, may step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute power.
Concerning the issue of a standing army, the anti-federalists had many authorities on their side. The great and authoritative jurist Sir William Blackstone had written vigorously concerning the dangers posed by standing armies, including their tendency to place within the community a permanently armed coterie of disreputable types. David Hume had warned that standing armies posed a permanent threat to liberty, as had Montesquieu. Locke, Sydney, Bolingbroke, Hamden – all warned against the dangers posed by standing armies during times of peace. History itself provided ample examples of standing armies used by those in power to compel obedience and get the people to submit to a will not their own. John DeWitt had written:
Does the complection of the proceedings countenance such a supposition? When they unprecedently claim the power of raising and supporting standing armies, do they tell you for what purposes they are to be raised?--How they are to be employed?--How many they are to consist of, and where to be stationed?--Is this power fettered with any one of these necessary restrictions which will shew they depend upon the militia, and not upon this infernal engine of oppression to execute their civil laws. The nature of the demand in itself contradicts such a supposition, and forces you to believe that it is for none of these causes--but rather for the purpose of consolidating and finally destroying your strength, as your respective Governments are to be destroyed.
Brutus, in his 8th and 9th essays, carefully laid out the case against standing armies, operating off the basic axiom that people would never authorize government to possess a power that would harm them, almost of necessity. Perhaps armies in times of peace would provide a kind of readiness against foreign dangers, most of which the anti-federalists believed were being exaggerated, but they could also be turned inward, as the means for forcing people to perform the central government’s bidding. It would police their lives, such policing contrary to the demands of liberty.
Then, too, the federal government in possession of a standing army would necessarily threaten the sovereignty of the states. Only if the states maintained their own militias would they be able to resist the encroachments of federal power. Many of the anti-federalists made variations of this argument, but perhaps none more forcibly than Marylander Luther Martin:
In answer to these declarations, it was urged, that if after having obtained to the general government the great powers already granted, and among those, that of raising and keeping up regular troops without limitation, the power over the militia should be taken away from the States, and also given to the general government, it ought to be considered as the last coup de grace to the State governments; that it must be the most convincing proof, the advocates of this system design the destruction of the State governments, and that no professions, to the contrary, ought to be trusted; and that every State in the union ought to reject such a system with indignation, since, if the general government should attempt to oppress and enslave them, they could not have any possible means of self defence; because the proposed system, taking away from the States the right of organizing, arming and disciplining of the militia, the first attempt made by a State to put the militia in a situation to counteract the arbitrary measures of the general government, would be construed into an act of rebellion, or treason; and Congress would instantly march their troops into the State.
In most of the state ratifying conventions, the issue of a standing peacetime army became a flashpoint. In Virginia, Richard Henry Lee proposed an amendment to the Constitution that would require for the raising of a peacetime army and the appropriation of funds a 2/3 vote in both chambers. Maryland delegates proposed an amendment that would limit Congress’s ability to raise an army at any time except during war, “and then only during the war.” New Hampshire passed an amendment similar to Virginia’s but insisted on the higher ¾ threshold. New York also proposed a 2/3 amendment, and a similar motion failed at the South Carolina convention. Supermajorities were generally considered essential to the protection of liberty, and the introduction of them into debates surrounding a standing army indicated how seriously many people at the time regarded the threat.
Hamilton, largely dismissive of such concerns, considering them meritless, made two main counter-arguments: that by placing provision for the army in the hands of the legislature the Constitution prevented the possibility of a standing army turning against the people, and that the Constitution didn’t insist on a peace-time army. Indeed, he proceeded to point out that only two of the extant state constitutions prohibited peace-time armies. Nor, he argued, did the Articles of Confederation provide any stipulated restrictions on standing armies (although he is arguing here from a negative). Thus, he believed, anyone who
happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings.
Hamilton thereupon proceeded to explain why the necessity of a standing army: the perpetual threats from foreign countries and from “the savage tribes on our western frontier.” It was a dangerous world, but also one, he realized, that would result in an escalation of power.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.
Brutus responded to Hamilton’s argument in Federalist 24 with one of his most forceful essays, which I will examine next week along with Hamilton’s subsequent response.
Director of the Ford Leadership Forum, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation
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